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The existing research on international democracy promotion is characterised by a pecu-
liar tension. On the one hand, many scholars agree that democracy promotion, since 
1990, has indeed become a significant aim guiding the foreign and development policies 
of North-Western democracies. On the other hand, there is a far-reaching consensus that 
this normative goal is regularly ignored once it collides with economic and/or security 
interests. This article challenges the notion that we can understand the motives and driv-
ers behind democracy promotion by assuming that interests and norms represent two 
neatly separated and clearly ranked types of factors. It argues that democracy promotion 
policies are the result of a complex interaction of interests and norms. After first devel-
oping this argument theoretically, the article presents results from a comparative re-
search project on US and German democracy promotion that support this claim. 
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Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the promotion of democracy has frequently been depicted as a foreign-
policy strategy that allows democratic states to simultaneously pursue their interests and 
follow their norms. As democratic regimes are considered inherently peaceful, coopera-
tive and prone to economic interdependence, spreading democracy promises tangible 
benefits.
1
 At the same time the promotion of democracy corresponds to the normative 
predispositions of democratic societies.
2
 This harmony of interests and norms, however, 
holds only as a general proposition and in the long term, at best (Spanger and Wolff 
2007). With a view to the actual practice of promoting democracy in individual coun-
tries, scholars have therefore continuously pointed to the fact that the normative aim of 
democracy promotion and other foreign-policy preferences such as security or economic 
interests frequently clash (see Carothers 1999; Goldsmith 2008; Grimm and Leininger 
2012; Schraeder 2002, 2003). Scholars also largely agree on what governments do once 
they are confronted with conflicting objectives: They subordinate the allegedly soft or 
secondary goal of democracy promotion to those hard ‘national interests’ that ultimately 
dominate the foreign policy also of democratic states (see Carothers 1999: 16; 
Schraeder 2003: 33, 41). 
There can be no doubt that the foreign policy of democratic governments is far from 
adhering in all circumstances to an ideal-type strategy of promoting the global spread of 
3 
democratic values and institutions. And this is quite plausibly related to what these gov-
ernments perceive as their countries’ national interests. Hence, the much-heard political 
criticism of double standards in the foreign policy of democratic states: For instance, 
while the US emphasises the importance of democratizing Cuba and European states 
impose sanctions on Belarus, no democratic country in the world is particularly active 
in trying to bring democracy to autocracies like China or even more so Saudi Arabia 
whose economic and/or security cooperation is regarded as crucial (see Youngs 2004: 
chapter 2). 
At first glance, this notion of interest-driven double standards in democracy promotion 
is rather plausible. This paper, however, argues that it needs differentiation both in theo-
retical and in empirical terms. Heuristically, it is useful to distinguish between (democ-
racy-related) norms and (material) interests as factors driving the foreign policy of dem-
ocratic states. Yet, with regard to causal analysis, we argue that the juxtaposition of the 
two categories of preferences is not compelling. In order to understand and/or explain 
the behaviour of democracy promoters, we have to analyse how (perceived) material 
interests and normative predispositions mutually shape each other. More specifically, in 
systematically identifying the factors that motivate and guide democracy promotion, 
this article argues that democracy promotion policies are the result of a complex interac-
tion of interests and norms. 
In the following, we first discuss the state of the art on democracy promotion. We de-
velop the theoretical argument why it is insufficient to expect democracy promoters to 
simply follow their tangible (material) interests when confronted with conflicting objec-
tives and outline our alternative perspective on the interaction of interests and norms in 
democracy promotion. The second section of the article introduces a comparative re-
search project on US and German democracy promotion in which we systematically 
studied how democracy promoters deal with conflicting objectives (see Wolff et al 
2014). The results of this project, which are summarised in the third section, provide the 
empirical evidence that we have to look at the interaction of interests and norms if we 
are to understand the motives and drivers behind democracy promotion. 
In this article, democracy promotion is defined in a broad sense and includes all 
measures aiming, from the outside, at ‘establishing, strengthening, or defending democ-
racy in a given country’ (Azpuru et al 2008: 151).
3
 Analysing democracy promotion, 
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therefore, requires looking at the entire spectrum of foreign, security, economic and 
development policies (see Schraeder 2003: 26). Systematically, we can distinguish five 
dimensions of democracy promotion: democracy promotion through (1) international 
observation (for instance, election monitoring), (2) foreign aid (democracy assistance), 
(3) diplomacy (moral appeals, shaming and blaming), (4) democratic conditionality (in-
centives and sanctions), and (5) coercive measures (use of military force). In terms of 
the aim pursued, democracy promotion is always promotion of democracy as under-
stood by a given external actor (see Hobson and Kurki 2012). We therefore refrain from 
adopting any particular definition of democracy and assess democracy promotion 
against the declared aims and standards of the respective donor. 
 
Theorising the interaction of interests and norms 
There is a wide range of studies dealing with different aspects of the international pro-
motion of democracy. Scholars have dealt with the specifics of democracy promotion 
policies employed by the US (Azpuru et al 2008; Carothers 1999; Cox et al 2000; Miller 
2010; Monten 2005; Peceny 1999; Robinson 1996; T. Smith 1994) and the EU, respec-
tively (Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Schimmelfennig et al 2006; Wetzel and Orbie 2011; 
Youngs 2008). Others have attempted to assess the impact of democracy promotion in 
the ‘recipient’ countries (Finkel et al 2007; Scott and Steele 2011), while yet others have 
critically examined the ideological and/or conceptual underpinnings of democracy pro-
motion (Goldsmith 2008; Hobson and Kurki 2012; Ish-Shalom 2006). 
Still, there is much less comparative research on democracy promoters that would aim 
at systematically identifying the factors that motivate and guide democracy promotion.
4
 
The search for these factors constitutes the primary aim of the research project on which 
this article is based. More specifically, the project and this paper ask how interests and 
norms shape the decisions democracy promoters make when confronted with conflict-
ing objectives. This focus on conflicting objectives is particularly suitable for the pur-
pose at hand: When democracy promoters (‘donors’) have to weigh up competing ob-
jectives and make difficult decisions, this allows for inferences as to the motives and 
drivers behind democracy promotion. 
When existing research considers conflicting objectives, the focus is mostly on what we 
call extrinsic conflicts: conflicts in which the aim to promote democracy clashes with 
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donor interests. Yet, in democracy promotion, such conflicts between norms and inter-
ests are usually accompanied by intrinsic conflicts of objectives that are characterised 
by a collision of different sub-goals of democracy promotion. For instance, an increase 
in political participation, while improving the quality of representation of a given politi-
cal regime, may threaten to undermine the stability and/or effectiveness of fragile dem-
ocratic institutions. Also ‘procedural’ and ‘substantial’ democracy norms may clash 
when a recipient government that is democratically elected pursues policies perceived 
as undemocratic. In such intrinsic conflicts, normative guidelines are ambivalent, and 
hence the confrontation of interests and norms becomes blurred. As each solution to an 
intrinsic conflict implies norm violation with regard to one democracy-related sub-goal 
(in favour of other sub-goals), this allows donors to solve extrinsic conflicts in favour of 
pursuing national interests without explicitly breaking with the declared aim of democ-
racy promotion. 
 
Privileging interests over norms: The limits of the ‘semi-realist’ view on democracy 
promotion 
The prevailing view on democracy promoters’ dealing with conflicting objectives con-
curs with what Thomas Carothers once called a ‘semi-realist approach to democracy 
promotion’. Democracy promotion, from this perspective, constitutes a relevant, but 
secondary foreign-policy aim. When the aim to promote democracy proves ‘contrary to 
economic or security interests […], it is usually overridden’ (Carothers 1999: 16). 
Summarising the results of a comparative research project, Peter Schraeder (2003: 41) 
similarly concluded that ‘democracy promotion is typically compromised when the 
normative goal of democracy clashes with other foreign policy interests’. A recent spe-
cial issue on conflicting objectives in democracy promotion confirmed this observation 
(Grimm and Leininger 2012: 408). 
The argument that the aim to promote democracy is secondary to other foreign-policy 
objectives combines two different rationales. On the one hand, states promote democra-
cy because they expect a payoff in terms of their material interests. As such, democracy 
promotion has to measure up with other instruments that conceivably serve national 
interests. From this perspective, there are no conflicting objectives but just competing 
instruments. On the other hand, the notion of the ‘normative goal of democracy’ 
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(Schraeder 2003: 41) refers to a hierarchy of interests and norms. Here, the mainstream 
view is that, when openly colliding, governments pursue what they see as their ‘national 
interests’, even if this means adopting normatively inappropriate behaviour. 
On closer look, both interpretations are not convincing. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the prevailing view among politicians and academics is that foreign policy interests 
and democratic values are very closely intertwined in democracy promotion. According-
ly, democracy promotion is generally not regarded as a ‘purely soft’ norm, but as a 
‘pragmatic interest that reinforces other interests’ (Carothers 1999: 60), and in this sense 
it is frequently characterised as a national ‘grand strategy’ (Doyle 2000: 21; Monten 
2005: 112). Scholars from quite different perspectives have argued that (US) democracy 
promotion has to be seen as a strategic project aimed at enhancing national security (T. 
Smith 1994; Miller 2010), supporting national economic interests (Cox 2000; S. Smith 
2000), or more generally underpinning the global hegemony of the US, ‘the West’ or 
some transnational class (Gills 2000; Robinson 1996). Even if one acknowledges that 
the link between democracy promotion and such strategic considerations is long-term 
only, whereas other concerns related, for instance, to trade and security policy have a 
short-term and much more tangible impact, the notion that there is a ‘strategic interest’ 
in promoting democracy (McFaul 2005: 158) is scarcely compatible with the thesis that 
it can only lay claim to relevance when no immediate interests stand in its way. 
A similar inconsistency in the literature on democracy promotion concerns the proposi-
tion that democracy promotion is a normative goal ‘only’ and therefore subordinate to 
materially defined foreign policy interests. Especially in the case of the US, scholars 
have shown the normative predisposition to promote democracy as a ‘civil-religious 
impulse’ or ‘mission’, deeply rooted in national identity (Poppe 2010: 5; see Desch 
2007; Monten 2005; T. Smith 1994).
5
 Cultural factors such as a particular national iden-
tity do not, of course, cause specific policies but operate in terms of constraining and 
enabling; they ‘predispose collectivities toward certain actions and policies rather than 
others’ (Duffield 1999: 772). As national identity shapes policy-makers’ minds and cre-
ates expectations (and needs for justification) in the domestic arena (Nau 2000: 128-
130), this effect cannot be simply turned off once a competing interest enters the equa-
tion. The same applies to the observation that democracy and democracy promotion 
have become increasingly established as international norms (Schraeder 2003: 25-26). 
7 
To the extent that there is such a shift in international norms, this has a regulative effect 
on international politics in the sense of limiting arbitrary and purely interest-based devi-
ations from norm-consistent behaviour (see McFaul 2005: 160-161). 
In sum, the notion that it is simple interest-driven double standards that explain the be-
haviour of democracy promoters is theoretically problematic because it fails to take into 
account the extent to which democracy promotion has become part of both the defini-
tion of strategic interests and of the broader normative-cultural, national and interna-
tional environment in which foreign policies are formulated, and hence the interplay of 
both. As Finnemore (2003: 16) has argued in her study on the purposes of military in-
terventions, treating ‘perceptions of legitimacy’ and ‘perceptions of utility’ as competing 
explanations ‘is not only difficult but probably misguided, since it misses the potentially 
more interesting question of how the two are intertwined and interdependent.’ For our 
endeavour the question is, therefore, not so much whether interests trump norms, but 
how interests and norms interact and shape each other in democracy promoters’ reac-
tions to conflicting objectives (see also Nau 2000). 
 
The interaction of interests and norms: Alternatively conditioned double standards 
The attempt to explain the reaction of democracy promoters to conflicting objectives by 
prioritising ‘hard’ foreign-policy interests over the ‘soft’ norm of democracy promotion 
is confronted with a basic problem: There is no objective way to assess which policy 
would serve the former or comply with the latter. Just like in the case of military inter-
vention studied by Finnemore (2003: 5-6), interests do not provide unequivocal policy 
guidance and normative guidelines frequently prove contradictory. 
A typical case of foreign-policy interests challenging the aim to promote democracy is a 
democratic recipient government whose policies are perceived as threatening vital donor 
interests. In this case, the donor government does not have an interest (in material 
terms) in the success of the recipient government, no matter its democratic credentials. 
As consequence, supporting opposition forces that are perhaps less democratic but more 
in line with donor interests becomes more plausible than supporting the government in 
its efforts to strengthen or deepen democratic governance. Such a reaction, while con-
tradicting the declared aim to promote democracy, could indeed help secure donor inter-
ests. However, there is an inherent uncertainty and risk in such an approach as it is by 
8 
no means clear that it will lead to the establishment of a government that better com-
plies with donor interests, but can also radicalise the recipient government, delegitimise 
the (‘foreign-controlled’) opposition, and increase domestic and international support 
for the recipient country. 
As a result, foreign-policy interests in this case do not determine a clear-cut policy re-
sponse: Even if the democratic government acts against donor interests, the benefits to 
be expected from attempts to change the status quo are far from guaranteed and easily 
offset by collateral damage. This is different in another typical case of extrinsic conflicts 
of objectives: a non-democratic recipient government that reliably cooperates with a 
given democracy promoter. Here, cooperating with the respective government – while 
ignoring or postponing efforts at promoting democracy – promises immediate yields in 




A similarly differentiated result emerges from normative considerations. In the case in 
which an interest-based policy calls for removing an elected government, this would 
clearly constitute an active violation of democratic norms. In the case of a cooperative 
authoritarian regime, however, interests call ‘only’ for omitting a normatively appropri-
ate behaviour, that is, they suggest not to question the incumbent government. Support-
ing the removal of a democratic government is clearly and undisputedly a violation of 
democratic norms and thus inappropriate; yet, continuing cooperation with a non-
democratic regime only neglects democratic norms which allows to circumscribe its 
appropriateness. This differentiated effect is strengthened by the fact that, in the former 
case, democracy-related norms and traditional international norms related to national 
sovereignty and non-intervention reinforce each other in the protection of a democratic 
government, while, in the latter case, sovereignty norms support the neglect of democ-
racy-related norms.  
In sum, neither interests nor norms have a uniform effect on shaping democracy promo-
tion policies. As seen, the effect of an interest in upholding the political status quo in a 
given recipient country is greater than that of an equally strong interest in changing it. 
At the same time, the effect of one and the same norm is stronger in prohibiting its vio-
lation than in producing compliance. In contrast to the mainstream view that emphasises 
interest-driven double standards at the expense of norm-consistent behaviour, this dif-
9 
ferentiated logic implies double standards that apply to both norms and interests. In the 
interaction between the two, this differentiated logic is reinforced because the effect of 
interests is weak when the effect of norms is strong, and vice versa.  
To put our argument in a nutshell: Vis-à-vis a democratic government that threatens 
donor interests, the normative prohibition to openly fight it has a marked impact on do-
nor policies in spite of these countervailing interests. In this case, the normative logic of 
appropriateness is clear-cut and thus relatively strong, while it is much less obvious that 
an interest-driven policy of changing the status quo in the recipient country would really 
pay off in terms of donor interests. Vis-à-vis a non-democratic government that serves 
donor interests, the comfort of the status quo consistently overrides the normative call 
on democracy promoters to engineer regime change. Here, the impact of norms is 
weaker (and a normatively appropriate outcome of regime change by no means se-
cured), while an interest-driven policy of cooperation promises immediate gains. This is 
what we call a logic of alternatively conditioned double standards, which, as we show 
below, helps understand the complex ways in which democracy promoters deal with 
conflicting objectives. 
 
Comparing US and German democracy promotion: The research project 
 
Case selection and conduct of case studies 
The research project, on which this article is based, analysed US and German policies 
towards six ‘recipient’ countries: Pakistan and Turkey, Bolivia and Ecuador, Belarus and 
Russia. As mentioned, in each of the recipient countries, the project zoomed in on par-
ticular periods in which political developments led to conflicting objectives on the part 
of the democracy promoters.  
The US was selected as ‘the world’s most powerful democracy with unrivalled global 
reach and capabilities’ (Herman and Piccone 2003: 212), which has decisive influence 
on the global discourse and practice of democracy promotion. Furthermore, the US is 
the world’s largest provider of democracy assistance (Azpuru et al 2008). Germany was 
chosen because it ranks among the most important European donors in democracy assis-
tance (Youngs 2008: 160-161). In addition, German foreign policy – including German 
democracy promotion – is often contrasted to the US approach. While the US is regular-
10 
ly associated with strong security interests and an assertive, pro-active or missionary 
style of promoting democracy, Germany is typically considered a ‘Civilian Power’ that 
favours multilateralism in its foreign policy, is driven by economic rather than by secu-
rity interests and behaves much more cautiously and reluctantly when it comes to inter-




The focus on US and German democracy promotion deliberately implies a state-centred 
perspective. One reason for this choice is that nation states are arguably still the most 
important type of actors in democracy promotion (see Magen and McFaul 2009: 2-4; 
Schraeder 2003: 34-40). The second reason is methodological: Given the differences in 
‘actorness’ between states, international and non-governmental organisations, trying to 
identify the factors that shape state, non-state and multilateral democracy promotion on 
the basis of one inclusive theoretical framework and one general design of structured, 
focused comparison does not promise sound results.  
In order to select recipient countries for the analysis, we first identified three regions 
that represent different types of challenges to democracy promotion: the Greater Middle 
East, South America and the post-Soviet space (see below). Within these regions, the 
individual countries were selected based on three criteria. First, since 1990, they have 
introduced basic institutions of democracy, at least temporarily.
8
 Second, prior to the 
emergence of conflicting objectives, none of the countries was in a confrontation with 
the US and/or Germany. These two characteristics are important because, in order to 
trace reactions to emerging conflicts of objectives, the starting point for democracy 
promoters had to be relatively benign. In all countries, however, political developments 
have turned out considerably more difficult and contradictory than generally expected in 
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In this sense, the six countries, like many oth-
ers, demonstrate the failure of the ‘Transition Paradigm’ (Carothers 2002). In contrast to 
linear conceptions of transition, the selected countries – and this is the third criterion – 
underwent processes of political change in which the dilemmas that are inherent to de-
mocratization arose in different forms and compositions.
9
 On the part of the external 
actors, these episodes meant that democracy promotion was challenged by serious con-
flicts of objectives. 
11 
Pakistan and Turkey represent challenges to democracy promotion that are characteristic 
of the (broadly defined) Greater Middle East. The rise of Islamist movements ‘from 
below’ challenges not only the political regimes in the region but also the interests of 
North-Western states cooperating with these regimes. Pakistan and Turkey are the two 
states in the region with at least temporarily democratic regimes. Their bilateral rela-
tions with the US and Germany have been generally cooperative and friendly, while 
both have been ‘targets’ of active efforts at promoting democracy. Since the 1990s, 
however, there have been growing concerns among democracy promoters about the 
increasing public presence of Islamist movements in the two countries as well as about 
the rise to power of Islamist parties. 
South America’s political regimes have also been challenged ‘from below’ since the turn 
of the century, albeit in quite different ways: Social movements opposed the alleged 
imperatives of neoliberal globalisation and toppled a number of elected governments. 
As part of a regional ‘turn to the left’, this opposition included a general critique of 
capitalism, liberal democracy and of the countries’ external dependence (especially on 
the US). Bolivia and Ecuador represent countries in which this criticism translated into 
government policy. This includes a fundamental transformation of the political regimes 
in question, a departure from (neo-)liberal economics and an escalation of socio-
political conflicts. These changes and conflicts have taken place within basically demo-
cratic settings, but nevertheless seriously challenge the interests and values of the 
North-Western donor community. 
Belarus and Russia represent a political path that is characteristic for much of the post-
Soviet space. Following an initial period of democratization in the early 1990s, in many 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) presidents were elected 
who turned to increasingly authoritarian rule. The result has been the emergence of re-
gimes ranging from semi-authoritarianism to outright dictatorship. Belarus and Russia 
represent those states in the region that after temporary transitions to democracy turned 
into the opposite direction.
10
 
In all three pairs of states democracy promoters have been confronted with significant 
conflicts of objectives that have both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions. Across the re-
cipient countries, ‘democracy’ – that is, democratic (majority) decisions – brought about 
results that, from the donors’ point of view, challenged or, in extreme cases, directly 
12 
threatened democracy (intrinsic conflict). At the same time, security and/or economic 
donor interests were adversely affected (extrinsic conflict). In the cases of Pakistan and 
Turkey, the common challenge to democracy promotion has been constituted by the rise 
of Islamist movements; this raises the question whether donors should tolerate or even 
support restrictions on democracy or even coups d’état in order to protect the secular 
state and societal pluralism (intrinsic) and secure cooperation with the ‘West’ (extrin-
sic). In Bolivia and Ecuador, the election of ‘radical’ governments have forced donors to 
decide whether to tolerate, in the name of democratic self-determination, a gradual de-
parture from universally conceived models of liberal democracy and market economy 
(intrinsic) as well as related threats to specific donor interests (extrinsic). In Belarus and 
Russia, political developments have given rise to the question of how democracy pro-
moters should deal with governments that use domestic societal support to revert to au-
thoritarianism (intrinsic) while donors are interested in securing continued international 
cooperation (at least on the part of Russia, extrinsic). 
For all 12 pairs of states, qualitative case studies were conducted that included an exten-
sive review of primary sources and scholarly literature as well as a series of interviews 
in both donor and recipient countries.
11
 On this basis, first, the general profile of bilat-
eral relations and the overall features of democracy promotion in the respective dyad 
were assessed. Then, following the method of process-tracing, donor reactions to con-
flicting objectives were analysed. As to the periods under investigation, all case studies 
considered the political development of the recipient countries as well as bilateral rela-
tions and donor policies since 1990 and, then, zoomed in on specific periods in which 
serious conflicts of objectives emerged (see the section on ‘conflicting objectives’ be-
low). The results of these individual case studies, finally, served as the empirical materi-




Operationalising interests and norms 
Drawing on theories of International Relations (IR) as well as on research on the Demo-
cratic Peace and democracy promotion, we have identified two interest- and two norm-
based factors that are considered to guide democracy promoters: (1) the security inter-
ests of the donor in a given recipient country; (2) its economic interests; (3) the donor’s 
specific culturally embedded conception of democracy promotion; and (4) international 
13 
norms, that is, the institutionalisation of norms related to democracy (promotion) in 
joint international organisations.
13
 As described below, these factors have been specified 
by drawing on both statistical data and qualitative assessments. For all but the third var-
iable (conceptions of democracy promotion) which is dichotomous, four-point ordinal 
scales were constructed that range from very low to very high and cover the empirical 




[Table 1 about here] 
 
Following a modified (Neo-) Realist IR perspective and rationalist approaches to the 
Democratic Peace, security interests favour democracy promotion when a donor gov-
ernment considers democratic regimes to behave more peacefully and cooperate more 
reliably in the international arena than non-democratic regimes. Promoting democracy, 
then, becomes an instrument of security policy (see Doyle 2000; T. Smith 1994). Hence 
it is security interests that determine whether democracy is promoted in a particular re-
cipient country.  
To rank security interests, three indicators were chosen. First, the extent of security co-
operation between donor and recipient was ranked by comparing data on military assis-
tance and military presence as well as by assessing joint – bi- and multilateral – organi-
sations, programs and activities directly related to security issues. A second indicator 
concerned the possession of nuclear weapons by the recipient country (no: very low, 
yes: very high). Third, the strategic relevance of the recipient from the perspective of the 
donor was ranked based on qualitative case analysis. The rounded average of these three 
indicators yields the overall levels for security interests reported in Table 1. 
Economic interests are equally often referred to in the literature. According to Economic 
Liberalism in IR (Moravcsik 1997: 528-529), democratic regimes promise conditions 
(predictability, stability, rule of law) that are crucial for economic cooperation. Democ-
racy promotion, from this perspective, directly serves economic interests (Ikenberry 
1999) – and it is economic interests that determines a donor’s foreign policy and, thus, 
also democracy promotion vis-à-vis a given recipient country.  
Two indicators measure economic interests: the amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the respective recipient country and the amount of bilateral trade, both meas-
14 
ured as a share of total donor FDI/trade. Based on the rounded and weighted averages of 
these two indicators, an ordinal scale was constructed ranging from very low to very 
high economic interests. 
From the perspective of an actor-centred Constructivist approach to IR (Harnisch 2003: 
340), scholars have emphasised that it is culturally rooted national self-perceptions, 
roles or identities that shape how states form and change national preferences, perceive 
and interpret the outside world (see Duffield 1999; Holsti 1970; Katzenstein 1996). The 
ways in which a government promotes democracy, conceptualises democratization pro-
cesses and defines its appropriate role as an external actor is, then, shaped by the histor-
ical experiences of a specific country and its more general (foreign) political culture. 
This factor – national conceptions of democracy promotion – is different from the other 
three in that it does not vary in accordance with different recipient countries: The theo-
retical expectation is that German and US democracy promotion policies will generally 
be shaped by their respective conceptual premises. Whether this is indeed the case – that 
is, to what extent actual policies correspond to overall rhetoric on democracy promotion 
–, is precisely one of the empirical questions for the comparative analysis. 
In order to assess the conceptual differences, a qualitative content analysis was conduct-
ed that investigated the general outline of democracy promotion in official government 
documents from the two countries. This content analysis drew on 20 primary sources for 
each government (from White House/Chancellery, foreign and defence ministries and 
USAID/Germany’s development ministry), covering all administrations since the early 
1990s. Both subsamples included the most important official strategy papers and 
speeches on democracy promotion and on the general outline of foreign, defence and 
development policy. Systematically, the content analysis identified the universal values 
that are said to guide policies, the understanding of democratization, the attitude to-
wards non-democrats and the style of democracy promotion.
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 Based on this analysis, 
German official rhetoric was categorised as generally corresponding to a ‘Civilian Pow-
er’ conception of democracy promotion while the US approaches an ideal-type concep-
tion we call ‘Freedom Fighter’. The former is guided by rather abstract and broad values 
and conceptualises democracy promotion in a gradual and cooperative manner focusing 
on the long term and favouring dialogue and inclusion; the latter explicitly and asser-
tively advocates the promotion of liberal-democratic values, favours immediate results 
15 




While actor-centred Constructivism emphasises the domestic socio-cultural context, 
Constructivist approaches in IR also refer to the impact of ‘international cultural envi-
ronments’ on foreign policy (Jepperson et al 1996: 34). More specifically, international 
norms can be seen as defining shared expectations of appropriate behaviour. In this 
sense, the extent to which democracy and democracy promotion are established as in-
ternational norms directly impacts on the foreign policy of states. Although such democ-
racy-related international norms have been established at the global level of the United 
Nations, they are much stronger, more explicit and institutionalised at the level of some 
regional organisations (Piccone 2005).  
The strength of democracy-related international norms in a given dyad is assessed by 
looking at the joint international (regional) organisation with the highest democracy 
standards. Qualitative criteria for ranking different organisations include the extent to 
which democracy is institutionalised as a common, binding principle as well as the ex-
tent to which instruments to actually promote democracy are established. The global 
minimum standard is defined by the UN (ranked very low), the maximum by the EU 
including in its enlargement process (ranked very high). Based on a review of secondary 
literature, the democracy norms of the Organisation of American States (OAS) were 
ranked as relatively strong (i.e. high), NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) as relatively weak (i.e. low). 
As can be seen in Table 1, the cases represent a wide range of constellations of interests 
and norms. Security interests on the part of the donor are sometimes pivotal, sometimes 
irrelevant. Economic interests are in some cases very high, in others marginal. In the 
cases involving the US, democracy promotion should be normatively shaped by a dif-
ferent conceptual approach (‘Freedom Fighter’) than in those involving Germany (‘Ci-
vilian Power’). Finally, a few pairs of states are joint members of international organisa-
tions with very high democracy-related norms, while others are not. 
 
Dealing with conflicting objectives: US and German democracy promotion in 
comparison 
16 
In the framework of this article, we cannot present the results of the mentioned research 
project in their entirety (see Wolff et al 2014). Instead we will zoom in on the ways in 
which the US and Germany dealt with conflicting objectives with a specific focus on 
the topic of this article: the interaction of interests and norms in democracy promotion. 
In the next section, we briefly summarise the conflicts of objectives that actually chal-
lenged US and German policies in the six recipient countries. Then, we show how a 
perspective on the interaction of interests and norms in general and the notion of alter-
natively conditioned double standards in particular help explain the observed patterns of 
reaction. 
Given that the following comparative analysis draws on 12 case studies, we can present 
the individual cases in condensed form only.
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 While focusing on a few cases that are 
particularly crucial for our argument would allow for a more in-depth presentation of 
the empirical evidence, we wanted to preserve the particular advantages that come with 
the relatively broad comparative scope of this study. First, comparing, for each recipient 
country, US and German policies allows us to control for the idiosyncratic features that 
may be produced by specific recipient contexts. Second, by discussing all six recipient 
countries we are able to compare cases which are characterised by both extrinsic and 
intrinsic conflicts of objectives with others in which only extrinsic, only intrinsic or 
barely any conflict of objectives arises. As a result, we can demonstrate how our argu-
ment works across the range of different configurations of interests and norms (summa-
rised in Table 1). 
 
Conflicting objectives 
The conflict situations in the six recipient countries pose quite different challenges to 
democracy – and thus produce equally different conflicts of objectives with which Ger-
many and the US are confronted in their policies of democracy promotion. This applies 
to both the extrinsic and the intrinsic conflicts. In the following paragraphs, we will first 
look at extrinsic conflicts and then analyze their interplay with intrinsic conflicts. We 
start with the dyads without significant extrinsic conflicts, to then analyze the pairs of 
states in which foreign-policy interests did clash with democracy promotion. 
In five pairs of states, democracy promoters were hardly confronted with extrinsic con-
flicts of objectives. This concerns German policy towards Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey 
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as well as German and US relations with Belarus. As far as Germany’s strategic inter-
ests are concerned, the governments led by Evo Morales in Bolivia (since 2006) and by 
Rafael Correa in Ecuador (since 2007) pose a classic low-intensity conflict: Germany’s 
respect for democratic self-determination has been challenged by these countries’ turn 
against ‘neoliberalism’ and towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, but the policy changes 
in the two Andean countries do not constitute threats to German ‘national interests’.
18
 
With respect to Turkey, Germany certainly has vital economic and security interests, 
and the fact that the largest Turkish-speaking diaspora in the world lives in Germany 
gives the German policy on Turkey a distinct domestic blend. This, however, has not 
produced an extrinsic conflict of objectives: Even when Islamist parties – the Welfare 
Party (RP) briefly in the mid-1990s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 
2002 – rose to power, Germany did not feel tempted to adopt a confrontational posture. 
In the case of Belarus, the autocratic regime established by President Alexander 
Lukashenko after his first election in 1994 has not led to extrinsic conflicts of objec-
tives, neither on the part of Germany nor on the part of the US. Only in the wake of the 
Caucasus war in 2008, the prospect of driving a wedge between Belarus and Russia – 
officially aligned in a union state – temporarily tempered the drive to confront 
Lukashenko with calls for democratization. Yet, most of the time and particularly pro-
nounced in the US, democracy promotion (as a means to change the Lukashenko re-
gime) was seen as serving ‘Western’ interests in regional balancing (as a means to con-
tain Russia within the CIS). 
The remaining seven pairs display clear-cut extrinsic conflicts of objectives. In US poli-
cies towards Bolivia, respect for self-determination has been compromised by drug-
related security interests and strategic considerations: President Morales declared an end 
to the US-driven ‘war on drugs’ and to ‘neoliberal’ economics, joined the Venezuelan-
led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and fiercely criticised 
the US government to the point of expelling, in 2008, the US ambassador and the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The election of Correa in Ecuador led to sim-
ilar developments, including the closure of the US military base in Manta and threats to 
US business interests in the oil sector; yet, Correa’s counternarcotics policies were 
much more in line with US preferences than those employed by Morales. In the case of 
Turkey pronounced US security interests in a reliable NATO ally collide with respect 
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for Turkish self-determination insofar as both Islamist parties, previously the RP and 
currently the AKP, have challenged the basic secular and Kemalist pro-Western orienta-
tion of the country.
19
 Furthermore, democratic reforms of the AKP government have 
aimed at reducing the political role and influence of the Turkish military, the core ad-
dressee of US security policy. In the case of Pakistan, it was the war in Afghanistan that 
produced a serious conflict of objectives in that General Pervez Musharraf and his auto-
cratic regime became a vitally important US ally in the ‘war on terror’ (until Mushar-
raf’s resignation in 2008). To some extent this also applied to Russia’s cooperation in 
the ‘war on terror’, on Afghanistan and Iran which worked against a policy of democra-
cy promotion towards the increasingly authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin. The 
German conflict of objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan in the wake of the Afghanistan cam-
paign evolved in line with the US. In the case of Russia, however, the German interest 
in cooperation has been markedly higher than the US interest, and it has been more eco-
nomic than security-related. 
Turning to intrinsic tensions in the democracy promotion agenda, the case studies not 
only reveal that the problem of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion consists 
of more than the well-known clash of ‘interests’ and ‘norms’; they also demonstrate that 
– and how – the extrinsic conflicts are intertwined with intrinsic conflicts. The excep-
tion is Belarus, where neither German nor US democracy promotion was confronted 
with significant intrinsic conflicts of objectives: Both governments perceived the 
Lukashenko government as indisputably autocratic and anticipated no risks (of destabi-
lisation) arising from potential democratization. In the remaining ten dyads, however, 
intrinsic conflicts of objectives posed real political challenges to be dealt with. 
Putin, for instance, did not simply abolish Russian democracy but he assured political 
stability and state capacity following the chaotic and not-too-democratic Yeltsin era. 
During his first two terms, it was therefore difficult to assess whether the net impact on 
democracy was positive, neutral or negative. In the case of Pakistan, there could be no 
doubt that the 1999 coup put an end to democratic rule, but the experience with Pakistan 
democracy in the 1990s and the difficult domestic and regional situation lent some plau-
sibility to Musharraf’s claim that a gradual path of managed modernisation were the 
best strategy for long-term and sustainable democratization. Likewise, the implications 
of the governments of Evo Morales (Bolivia), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Recep Tay-
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yip Erdoğan (Turkey) for democracy in respective countries are also ambivalent, if with 
a clearly pro-democratic bend. All three represent important progress towards improv-
ing democracy while, at the same time, their political projects include elements that – 
from the perspective of the donors – pose threats to liberal democracy: the preference 
for a plebiscitarian mode of governance which undermines liberal checks and balances 
and can pave the way towards one-party dominance; or the promulgation of indigenous, 
socialist or Islamic values at variance with liberal-democratic values. 
 
Patterns of reaction 
In tracing the patterns of reaction, we will again first discuss the five cases without ex-
trinsic conflicts and then analyze the seven remaining pairs of states.  
As was to be expected, donor reactions in the first group of dyads were generally in line 
with democracy promotion. Even in these rather straightforward cases, however, a clos-
er look at the actual practice of democracy promotion in these dyads shows the need to 
look at the specific configurations of interests and norms and consider the potential rel-
evance of intrinsic conflicts of objectives. 
German policies towards Bolivia and Ecuador basically continued without major 
changes after Morales and Correa took office, combining support for and cooperation 
with the respective governments with non-provocative and non-confrontational democ-
racy assistance activities. As it is typical for Germany, German official democracy aid to 
Bolivia and Ecuador has been focused on the public sector, governance-related issues 
and cooperation with the state, while the parastatal political foundations emphasised an 
all-encompassing dialogue, gradual change and long-term capacity building. In dealing 
with intrinsic conflicts in the two countries, Germany favoured strategies of engagement 
and supported processes of inclusive dialogue. Diplomatic appeals were used only very 
cautiously and the German government consistently avoided taking political sides. 
These patterns are generally in line with the overall aim of promoting democracy, but 
their specific shape cannot be explained simply by the absence of (adverse) economic 
and/or security interests: They rather correspond to the norms that guide a Civilian 
Power’s democracy promotion. 
In the case of US and German relations with Belarus, the low level of security or eco-
nomic interests in the country facilitated a relatively consistent and increasingly coordi-
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nated (albeit largely ineffective) Western policy of combining diplomatic pressure, pub-
lic criticism and sanctions against the Lukashenko regime. In fact, German policies to-
wards Belarus have been unusually assertive, which can be traced to the absence of in-
trinsic conflicts.
20
 Still, there are interesting differences between the US and Germany, 
which mirror the normative distinction between a Civilian Power and a Freedom Fighter 
conception of democracy promotion. While US support for civil-society groups explicit-
ly aimed at empowering the opposition to Lukashenko, support for Belarusian civil so-
ciety by Germany’s official development cooperation and political foundations did not 
go beyond the traditional, cooperative and politically non-partisan profile of German 
democracy promotion. The German government also generally supported EU sanctions 




German policy towards Turkey generally mirrors the cooperative stance mentioned in 
the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador. One crucial difference, however, concerns the role of 
the EU. Whereas Germany’s bilateral democracy assistance was fairly limited and indi-
rect (focused on technical issues), its main instrument has been intrusive political condi-
tionality established by the EU enlargement process. This directly corresponds to the 
strong democracy norms at the regional level. However, the growing scepticism of the 
German government about Turkish accession to the EU has increasingly undermined 
this scheme of conditionality, directly contradicting the normative guidelines of both the 
Civilian Power conception and the regionally established set of norms. 
Now we turn to the seven cases with clear-cut extrinsic conflicts. In line with the logic 
of alternatively conditioned double standards, these cases can be divided into two 
groups, according to the character of the recipient regime and the nature of the conflict: 
In US and German relations with Pakistan and Russia, democracy promoters had vital 
interests to cooperate with an autocratic (Musharraf) or increasingly authoritarian 
(Putin) government; US policies towards Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey, by contrast, 
were confronted with the need to deal with democratic governments acting against stat-
ed national interests. As suggested by our theoretical argument, the interaction of inter-
ests and norms plays out differently in these two groups of dyads. 
US and German policies towards Pakistan and Russia confirm the expectation that, 
when vital (i.e., high or very high) security and/or economic interests are served by co-
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operation with incumbent governments, donors engage in democracy promotion only 
within the narrow constraints defined by these interests. Neither German nor US poli-
cies openly challenged Musharraf’s or Putin’s rule. In general, democracy-related criti-
cism was downplayed, democratic conditionality ruled out and democracy assistance 
confined to cooperative, non-sensitive and long-term activities. Most notably, the US 
government after 9/11 waived democracy-related (and other) sanctions against the 
Musharraf regime and, in the following years, provided massive budgetary support for 
the military regime, thereby de facto promoting autocracy in Pakistan. In the case of 
Russia, official US statements became increasingly critical during George W. Bush’s 
second term in office; but this had no substantial operational consequences and was 
later replaced by Obama’s ‘reset’. In the case of German policies towards Russia, even 
diplomatic appeals have been very cautious not to provoke this important international 
partner. 
In dealing with both Pakistan and Russia, intrinsic conflicts enabled donors to justify 
their policies as normatively appropriate. The German government, for example, con-
sistently pointed to the burden of history, the (still early) stages of democratic develop-
ment, the need for stability as well as to difficult socio-economic conditions in Russia in 
order to qualify existing ‘deficits’. In a similar way, US and German support for 
Musharraf was in part explained by the need to stabilise the country and, in terms of a 
strategy of gradual modernisation, to make it fit for democracy (given both the turbulent 
history of fragile democratic governments and the current terrorist/Islamist threat). 
At the same time, norms did continue to shape bilateral relations, if in ways constrained 
by perceived national interests. Towards Russia, democracy promotion remained a rele-
vant issue for both Germany and the US, even if this regularly interfered with interest-
driven business as usual, at least in terms of raising suspicion. This, on the one hand, 
mirrors international democracy norms, which are stronger in Western relations with 
Russia than with Pakistan. On the other hand, it results from domestic pressure within 
Germany and the US and, thus, expresses the normative political context in which dem-
ocratic foreign policies are formulated. For example, the relatively sympathetic attitude 
of the German government towards Putin’s Russia regularly met with public criticism 
from opposition parties, NGOs and the media. Thus democracy and human rights re-
mained on the bilateral agenda, even if on a rather low level. The not-too-political no-
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tion of a ‘modernisation partnership’ between Germany and Russia offered a way to do 
justice to the normative guidelines of a Civilian Power conception of democracy promo-
tion, without risking confrontation with the Russian government. In US policies towards 
Russia, it was members of Congress that, in line with the Freedom Fighter conception 
of democracy promotion, called for adopting much more assertive (and confrontational) 
measures. Even the close US cooperation with Pakistan following 9/11 proved contro-
versial in the US and when, in 2007, tensions between Musharraf and the judiciary esca-
lated it became increasingly difficult for the US administration to stick to its ally.
22
 In 
trying to do justice to both perceived national interests and the normative demands from 
within the US, the Bush administration in 2007/2008 supported a controlled transition to 
civilian rule that would still leave Musharraf in the presidency. 
In sum, even in the cases of US and German relations with Pakistan and Russia a purely 
interest-based explanation does not grasp the complex dynamics of donor policies. But 
the general patterns of reaction follow the overall logic of alternatively conditioned 
double standards – which, in these examples, corresponds to the ‘semi-realist’ view: 
Given vital security and/or economic interests in cooperation with incumbent govern-
ments, both the US and Germany generally omitted any activities aimed at reversing the 
military coup in Pakistan or the authoritarian tendencies in Russia. Whereas in the case 
of the US such policies did not at all correspond to the Freedom Fighter conception of 
democracy promotion and thus clearly contradicted overall government rhetoric, the 
German case shows that the Civilian Power conception of democracy promotion allows 




US policies towards Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey represent the other side of the coin of 
our argument and, in fact, confirm the constraints on enforcing foreign-policy interests 
if this requires openly acting against democracy in recipient countries. Despite the vio-
lation of vital US interests by the Morales, Correa and Erdoğan administrations men-
tioned above, the US administration continued cooperation with the elected govern-
ments and refrained from confrontational reactions. 
In the case of US-Bolivian relations, there was some US democracy aid designed to 
support political and institutional counterweights to the Morales government. But, at the 
same time, the US government continued support for the government and was willing to 
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adjust US democracy assistance to Bolivian demands. Tit-for-tat responses – such as the 
expulsion of the Bolivian ambassador, the suspension of trade preferences and the ex-
clusion of Bolivia from the US Millennium Challenge Account in 2008 – were limited 
(by historic standards) and followed by attempts at diplomatic re-engagement. When the 
Bolivian government in 2009 demanded the USAID democracy program in the country 
to be closed down, the US administration did comply with this demand and still contin-
ued negotiating a new bilateral framework agreement (signed in late 2011).  
In relations with Ecuador, despite the closure of the US military base in Manta, expul-
sions of US embassy personnel in 2009 as well as conflicts between US oil companies 
and Ecuador, bilateral relations remained remarkably calm, and the US continuously 
renewed trade preferences for the country until the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act (ATPDEA) finally expired in July 2013. US democracy assistance to 
Ecuador included some support for civil-society organisations with an oppositional rep-
utation, but in general US activities to strengthen pluralism and checks on the govern-
ment were rather cautious and in line with Correa’s preferences (focusing on local gov-
ernments and the judicial system). 
In the case of Turkey, the US – while sticking to its traditional Kemalist allies and the 
military in particular – also continued cooperating with the AKP government and tried 
to maintain a rather neutral position vis-à-vis intra-Turkish conflict. In contrast to the 
German government, the US refrained from explicitly supporting the AKP government 
against domestic threats to ban the party in 2008. Still, Turkey under the AKP govern-
ment continued to receive significant amounts of US foreign aid. This aid included only 
a minor part of – decidedly non-confrontational – democracy assistance. In no instance 
did US diplomacy or foreign aid actively confront the AKP government.  
Of course, these cautious US reactions in Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey reflect not nec-
essarily a genuine respect for democratic norms, but also a pragmatic acceptance of the 
balance of power in the recipient countries as well as the uncertainties and risks associ-
ated with any attempts to undermine respective governments.
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 This mutual reinforce-
ment of the normative prohibition and the material expediency to fight elected govern-
ments is at the core of our argument: These cases suggest that democratic legitimacy 
protects governments that act against US preferences from being confronted with corre-
sponding US countermeasures. 
24 
At the same time, the prevalence of intrinsic conflicts enabled the US to frame only lim-
ited support to democratic governments as normatively in line with democracy promo-
tion. In the case of Turkey, US reluctance to explicitly support the AKP government 
against domestic threats from the old Kemalist elite was justified by referring to the 
country’s constitution and its ‘secular democratic principles’ (which was, to be sure, 
once imposed by the military). Bolivia’s exclusion from US Millennium Challenge Ac-
count aid was technically based on a gradual decline in governance indicators. And the 
US focus on fighting drug production and trafficking in the Andean region has always 
been justified as contributing as much to core US interests as to the stability of the local 
democratic regimes. 
In general, US reactions to intrinsic conflicts of objectives in Bolivia, Ecuador and Tur-
key resemble the pattern observed for Germany. On the one hand, both Germany and 
the US evaluated the situation according to their particular (liberal-democratic and capi-
talist) concepts of a ‘good’ political order: They were generally sceptical of Islamist 
parties in Turkey and feared ‘Islamisation’ (or ‘Iranisation’), and they were in favour of 
preserving as much as possible the liberal-democratic character of the emerging politi-
cal regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador. In general, the US, in line with its own democratic 
tradition, tended to emphasise checks and balances and political counterweights more 
than Germany. Yet, in the end, neither the US nor Germany insisted on their specific 
models of democracy but were rather flexible and pragmatic in adjusting to local con-
ceptions when in free and fair elections undisputed majorities expressed their support 
for a given direction of political development, as with the AKP agenda for Turkey and 
the political projects of Morales and Correa in the South American cases.
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 ‘Technical’ 
advice, capacity building and the promotion of dialogue as well as diplomatic appeals 
served as instruments to spread donor concepts of democracy and development, to pro-
mote a pluralist debate and to strengthen ‘moderate’ (democratic, liberal) voices. Yet, 
once domestic politics in recipient countries in one way or another ‘solved’ an intrinsic 
conflict, donors basically accepted this internal solution – whether it complied with do-






Across the 12 cases, donor policies were found as either more cooperative or more de-
mocracy-oriented than the ‘semi-realist’ perspective would have led us to expect. Yet, at 
the same time, when seen from a normative or idealist perspective on democracy pro-
motion, policies were either too confrontational or too cautious. These ambivalent pat-
terns, we argue, are grasped by the logic of alternatively conditioned double standards. 
For instance, in US policies towards Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey, ‘national interests’ 
would have suggested much less cooperation with the incumbent governments than was 
observed. Still, US respect for democratic self-determination has been more ambiguous 
than normatively appropriate. German policies towards Turkey and Russia as well as 
US policies towards Russia have been more democracy-oriented than purely rationalist 
interest calculation would appreciate: Democracy promotion was clearly circumscribed 
by perceived national interests and, yet, the declared aim to promote democracy did 
continue to shape donor policies and bilateral relations more generally. At the same 
time, the extent to which donors actively promoted democracy in these cases was very 
low indeed when compared to an idealistic perspective on democracy norms. 
The notion of alternatively conditioned double standards, by grasping the differentiated 
impact of and the interplay between interests and norms, helps understand these com-
plex realities of democracy promotion: the particularly ambiguous US policies towards 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Turkey; the unusually consistent pattern of democracy promotion 
in the cases US/Belarus, Germany/Belarus, Germany/Bolivia and Germany/Ecuador; 
the low-profile of democracy promotion in the dyads US/Russia, Germany/Russia and 
Germany/Turkey; and the virtual non-existence of any democracy promotion in US and 
German policies towards Pakistan. 
Taking the interaction of interests and norms into account also requires a closer look at 
the precise nature of both the specific interests and the particular norms that interact in a 
given case. For instance, it is the combination of economic interests and the normative 
predispositions characteristic of the Civilian Power that explains why Germany started 
to engage Pakistan’s military ruler Musharraf and actually resumed its development 
cooperation with the country already before 9/11. The US attempt to support political 
and institutional counterweights to the Morales government in Bolivia – which contrast-
ed with a much more cooperative and government-oriented German style of democracy 
assistance – was clearly in line with US interests (threatened by Morales), but was argu-
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ably also shaped by a specific, decidedly liberal conception of democracy. This also 
helps understand why German and US policies towards Belarus, while broadly in line, 
still had a different bias towards engaging or sanctioning the Lukashenko regime: In the 
design of US policies an interest in containing Russian influence combined with a nor-
mative propensity to use confrontational measures to promote regime change (‘Freedom 
Fighter’), while in the case of Germany both the strategic approach to (engaging) Russia 
and normative predispositions (‘Civilian Power’) qualified the willingness to use de-
mocracy sanctions and other confrontational measures. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that democracy promotion can neither be understood as simply 
norm-guided nor as purely interest-driven. Defying the juxtaposition of material and 
ideational factors, democracy promotion policies are the result of a complex interaction 
of interests and norms. More specifically, we have argued that this interaction follows a 
logic of alternatively conditioned double standards. In contrast to the mainstream view 
that emphasises interest-driven double standards at the expense of norm-consistent be-
haviour, this differentiated logic implies double standards that apply to both norms and 
interests and are reinforced by the interaction between the two (because the effects of 
norms are relatively weak precisely when the effects of interests are relatively high and 
vice versa). After first developing this argument theoretically, we have presented results 
from a comparative research project on US and German democracy promotion that sup-
port this claim. Of course, the question of generalisability remains – calling for further 
comparative research, possibly also of a large-N kind. 
When analysing how democracy promoters deal with conflicting objectives, the logic of 
alternatively conditioned double standards helps explain, in particular, one important 
pattern that we observe across our case studies: The constraining effects of democracy-
related norms are much stronger when interest-driven policies would suggest confront-
ing a democratic government than they are when would-be democracy promoters have a 
strong interest in cooperating with an autocratic one. As we have argued, the former is 
shaped by the interaction between a relatively strong normative prohibition (not to ac-
tively violate democracy-related norms) and a relatively weak interest-based motivation 
(because actively fighting a government is risky), while in the latter case the normative 
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prohibition (against omitting appropriate behaviour) is weaker and the interest-based 
motivation stronger (because cooperation promises immediate gains). 
To be sure, phrases such as ‘relatively strong’ and ‘relatively weak’ imply that this ar-
gument is not about predetermined outcomes: Being democratically elected increases 
the protection of a recipient government against interest-driven countermeasures by 
North-Western democracies, but it is not an absolute guarantee. This qualification is 
also related to the fact that the stated normative effect depends on perceptions of com-
plex political realities and corresponding expectations of appropriate behaviour. For 
instance, the political agenda pursued by an elected government may be presented as 
threatening democracy – paradoxically justifying undemocratic countermeasures in the 
name of protecting democracy against its enemies. This pattern is well-known from the 
anti-communist narrative during the Cold War, which equated communist with undemo-
cratic. In the contemporary world, North-Western reactions to electoral successes by 
Islamist forces have, at times, exhibited similar features, without however (up to now) 




These qualifications clearly suggest that the ways in which the interaction of interests 
and norms shapes actual democracy promotion policies cannot be simply predicated on 
some quasi objective factors. Yet, in line with the logic of alternatively conditioned 
double standards, what still remains is a specific normative burden of proof that applies 
in the case of actions against democratic governments – a normative obstacle that is 
further supported by the uncertain prospects of pursuing one’s ‘material’ interests 
through a policy of regime change. 
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Table 1: Configurations of interests and norms in comparison 
 
(1) Security  
Interests 






USA/Pakistan very high high FF very low 
Germany/Pakistan high high CP very low 
USA/Turkey high high FF low 
Germany/Turkey high very high CP very high 
USA/Bolivia high low FF high 
Germany/Bolivia very low very low CP very low 
USA/Ecuador high high FF high 
Germany/Ecuador very low low CP very low 
USA/Belarus very low very low FF low 
Germany/Belarus low low CP low 
USA/Russia very high high FF low 
Germany/Russia very high very high CP high 
Note: All factors but ‘National Conceptions’ were ranked by drawing on both statistical data and qualita-
tive assessments as briefly indicated above (an appendix with detailed information is available from the 
authors). All (sub-) indicators and determinants were ranked on a four-point ordinal scale (very low, low, 
high, very high). The third factor is a dichotomous variable that is either FF (Freedom Fighter) or CP 
(Civilian Power) because actor-centred Constructivism would not expect idiosyncratic conceptions of 
democracy promotion to vary in accordance with different recipient countries. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 This argument has been made, most prominently, by research on the so-called Democratic Peace. See, 
for instance, Cox et al. (2000); Doyle (2000); Ikenberry (1999); Ish-Shalom (2006). 
2
 For some prominent writings that deal with (and largely defend) this notion of democracy promotion as 
a foreign-policy strategy that is both morally good and strategically smart, see Doyle (2000); Ikenberry 
(1999); Muravchik (1991); T. Smith (1994); Talbott (1996); Youngs (2004: chapter 2). 
3
 In response to the association of ‘democracy promotion’ with the policies of the George W. Bush 
administration, scholars and practitioners have increasingly suggested replacing it with the more benign 
notion of ‘democracy support’ (see Lennon 2009). 
4
 Most studies of a theoretical and/or explanatory purpose focus on one democracy promoter, mostly the 
US (see Miller 2010; Monten 2005; Peceny 1999; Robinson 1996). Existing comparative studies on 
democracy promoters are largely descriptive (see Burnell 2000; Herman and Piccone 2003; Magen et al 
2009; Youngs 2004). Also the edited volume by Schraeder (2002), which offers interesting insights into 
the factors that drive democracy promotion, has not been designed to systematically account for 
differences and changes in democracy promotion policies. 
5
 With a view to both ‘Americans and Europeans’, Magen and McFaul (2009: 2) argue that ‘Democracy 
as a constitutive norm of the West is stronger than ever before, […] while its promotion outside the 
transatlantic community has rapidly become an accepted and increasingly institutionalized foreign policy 
practice’. 
6
 Of course, supporting autocratic regimes can also backfire in the longer term as autocracies are 
considered less stable than democracies. But the crucial difference between the two constellations is that 
cooperation with an autocracy combines immediate gains with an uncertain future, while the benefits to 
be expected from a policy of promoting regime change are neither reliably calculable in the short nor in 
the long term. 
7
 Research usually compares US and ‘European’ or EU democracy promotion efforts (see Carothers 2009; 
Kopstein 2006; Magen et al 2009; Youngs 2004). For our purposes, however, such a comparison is 
problematic given the heterogeneity of ‘Europe’ and the very peculiar ‘actorness’ of the European Union. 
8
 The precise criterion for case selection was that a country had at least temporarily reached a minimum of 
six points on the Polity IV scale (see Marshall and Jaggers 2006). 
9
 In the project (Wolff et al 2014) we broadly distinguish three dilemmas of democratization: (1) 
Democratic regimes – and, in particular, political regimes in a process of democratization – can be 
threatened by escalating conflicts destabilizing democratic institutions (‘democracy’ vs. ‘stability’). (2) 
Multiple and contradictory societal demands may render an effective and democratic governance 
impossible (‘democracy’ vs. ‘governability’). (3) Democratic procedures can lead to majority decisions 
that threaten core (constitutional) principles of democracy (‘democracy’ vs. ‘majority’). 
10
 Other countries of the region such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan did not come close to a 
democratic regime status in the 1990s (see Marshall and Jaggers 2006). Countries that did so (such as 
Armenia, Georgia or Ukraine) did not experience a clear-cut democratic backlash. Belarus and Russia, by 
contrast, are classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House (2012). 
11
 Interviews were conducted with representatives of the two donor governments and the respective 
organisations implementing official democracy promotion, with representatives of recipient governments 
and non-state partner organisations as well as with academic experts in the different countries. 
12
 On the two overall methods of process-tracing and structured, focused comparison, see, for instance, 
George and Bennett (2005). 
13
 In the research project, we identified and analyzed two additional factors: the relative power position in 
the bilateral relationship between donor and recipient and domestic special interests in the donor country. 
Given space restrictions and our focus on the interaction of interests and norms, these factors are not 
discussed here (but see Wolff et al 2014). For a comprehensive analysis of competing theoretical 
perspectives on democracy promotion, see Wolff and Wurm (2011). 
14
 A comprehensive presentation of the data, measurement and sources can be found in an appendix 
available from the authors on request. 
15
 The analysis – including sources, methods and results – is presented in Poppe et al. (2014). 
16
 These two ideal-type conceptions are systematically developed in Poppe et al. (2014). Our ideal type 
‘Civilian Power’ draws on the correspondent concept introduced by Hanns Maull (1990). 
17
 For more details, see the case study chapters in Wolff et al (2014). 
 
35 
                                                                                                                                               
18
 As seen in the section above, German economic and security interests in the two Andean countries were 
low. Only in one (minor) case, a Germany company and, thus, German business interests were affected by 
the new Bolivian policies of ‘nationalisation’. 
19
 In a notable decision in 2003, the Turkish parliament did not allow US troops to invade Iraq from 
Turkish soil. 
20
 In addition, although regional democracy-related norms as formally established by joint international 
organisations are rather low in this case, the German perception of Belarus as a European country 
expected to comply with European values and norms (‘Europe’s last dictatorship’) made explicit and 
confrontational measures for democracy promotion appear normatively appropriate in this particular 
country. 
21
 Exceptions were the reactions to the 1996 referendum and to the repression after the 2010 elections. 
22
 What is remarkable about German policies towards Pakistan is that the German government started to 
engage Musharraf and actually resumed its development cooperation with the country already in 2000, 
that is, well before 9/11. This policy, therefore, cannot be explained simply in terms of security interests. 
23
 Across the cases, US rhetoric proved much more explicit than Germany’s in terms of emphasizing 
normative standards and criticizing what it perceives as violation of such standards. The US was also 
more willing to respond to open violations of democratic rule with (the threat of) sanctions. US 
democracy assistance, like German official aid, applied cooperative, government-oriented and long-term 
strategies but it also included support for – and empowerment of – opposition (civil-society) groups. And 
in some instances the US even tried to directly influence the outcome of internal democratic processes. In 
general, therefore, US democracy promotion draws on both Freedom Fighter-type and Civilian Power-
type activities, while Germany confines itself to the latter. 
24
 The crisis in US-Bolivian diplomatic relations, which included the expulsion of the US ambassador and 
the DEA and was accompanied by a domestic consolidation of the Morales government, is a case in point. 
Whatever the precise nature and extent of US support for the Bolivian opposition, it clearly backfired 
both in terms of domestic politics in Bolivia and in terms of US influence on the Morales government. 
25
 In addition, relatively good performance in terms of stability, peace and governance led donors to 
downplay democracy-related problems. This, for example, improved donor perceptions of the democratic 
performance of the AKP government in Turkey and Correa in Ecuador, and it attenuated critical 
assessments of Musharraf and Putin. 
26
 The forms of such ‘acceptance’ ranged from toleration – in the sense of not adopting active 
countermeasures – all the way to direct support. 
27
 Prominent examples include the debate about and the reactions to the Hamas victory in Palestine in 
2006, the response to the election of and then coup against Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in 2012/2013, or, in 
the early 1990s, the North-Western toleration of the aborted elections in Algeria. 
